Assuring data privacy with PRIVAS - a tool for data publishers by Miguel, Joana et al.
IADIS International Journal on Computer Science and Information Systems 
Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 41-58 
ISSN: 1646-3692 
41 
ASSURING DATA PRIVACY WITH PRIVAS  
– A TOOL FOR DATA PUBLISHERS 
Joana Margarida Miguel1, Maria João Varanda Pereira2, Pedro Rangel Henriques1  
and Mario Berón3 
1Centro ALGORITMI – Universidade do Minho, Portugal 
2CeDRI – Instituto Politécnico de Bragança, Portugal 
3University of San Luis, Argentina 
ABSTRACT 
The technology of nowadays allows to easily extract, store, process and use information about individuals 
and organizations. The increase of the amount of data collected and its value to our society was, at first, a 
great advance that could be used to optimize processes, find solutions and support decisions but also 
brought new problems related with lack of privacy and malicious attacks to confidential information. 
In this paper, a tool to anonymize databases is presented. It can be used by data publishers to protect 
information from attacks controlling the desired privacy level and the data usefulness. In order to specify 
these requirements a DSL (PrivasL) is used and the automatization of repository transformation, that is 
based on language processing techniques, is the novelty of this work. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to advances in information processing technology and storage capacity, modern 
organizations end up processing and storing a large volume of data — personal details of 
individuals and organizations — for multiple purposes. Currently this volume is 2.5 quintillion 
bytes every day and it tends to increase in the next years (Marr, 2018). In order to analyze such 
a huge amount of data and extract knowledge from that, there is a strong research line inside the 
computer science area: artificial intelligence techniques were further explored namely data 
mining, statistical models used to discover patterns and compare historical data and other 
machine learning approaches were implemented. (Chakrabarti et al., 2006). Today’s large 
companies, such as Amazon, Google, Facebook, Spotify, take advantages from the amount of 
data and information they have about their customers. There are also other important 
organizations that use the data in different ways like in test environments and simulations 
(Goldman, 2018). 
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However, the application of these techniques can cause undesirable effects such as viewing 
personal, private, sensitive and confidential data. In order to produce results from data 
exploration it is also necessary to raise privacy and information security concerns (Naik and 
Ghule, 2013). Even if these processes can bring a number of benefits, advantages and 
discoveries, it is fundamentally to ensure that privacy is guaranteed. For a long period of time, 
privacy of the user data was neglected (Corrigan, Craciun and Powell, 2014). Nowadays, 
regulators are starting to worry about such important topics. One of the examples of this newer 
preoccupation is the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Murphy, 2018), that is 
already in place since 25th May 2018, and tries to regulate the protection and privacy of user’s 
data and sensitive information. 
In order to protect information is crucial to identify all the actors of the data exploration 
process. The different types of users in this process are: Data Provider (that provides the data), 
Data Collector (that collects and stores the data provided), Data Publisher (that transforms data 
and publishes it to be explored) and Data Explorer (that explores the data and retrieves 
information). Figure 1 illustrates the data exploration process with all of these users and roles. 
As privacy threats exist along and in every step of the data exploration process, each one of 
these users has privacy concerns and is able to ensure privacy with a set of methods and 
techniques. The Data Provider can protect its data by using external tools to provide fake data 
or even to limit the quantity and type of information provided when there is an intention to sell 
its data for some value. Data Collector can take some measures to first collect the data safely 
and then use some tools to store data while preserving privacy. The Data Publisher can assure 
the data privacy by adopting and applying the privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) 
techniques. Finally, Data Explorer can assure the privacy preserving by adopting the techniques 
according with the exploring purpose (for example, for the data mining process a set of  
privacy-preserving data mining techniques is available) (Xu et al., 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1. Global process of data exploration 
A system called Privas has been developed to aid the Data Publisher in its data publishing 
process. This system accepts a repository and creates a copy maintaining the information to be 
explored (coherence in data to be analyzed) but assuring that involved individuals/organizations 
cannot not be identified by applying PPDP techniques. Privas offers PrivasL, a Domain Specific 
Language (DSL) that easily allows to specify: the original repository schema, the identification 
of the tables/columns that one wants to explore and the definition of the privacy level to be 
assured. The PrivasL specification is submitted to Privas processor that interprets it. Then 
Privas automatically chooses the best techniques to apply to the repository in order to transform 
it and improve its privacy level. The compilers’ generator — ANTLR4 — is used to implement 
PrivasL processor. This brings novelty and value to our contribution comparing to the actual 
manual implementation of anonymization techniques. 
In Section 2 we shortly present the most relevant ‘privacy-preserving data publishing 
(PPDP)’ methods or techniques proposed in the literature for data anonymization after being 
collected and before exploration, balancing privacy assurance and information preservation. In 
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that section three different perspectives are discussed. We did not include specifically a related 
work section because all the tools available do not automatically anonymize data and either 
focus on masking the data or require knowledge, expertise and configuration to apply the 
anonymization techniques. Our proposal, Privas tool, is introduced in Section 3. In that Section 
3, after an overview of the system features and a brief description on how Privas is integrated 
in the flow of the global process for data exploration, Privas architecture is explained in detail. 
Then a description of PrivasL, designed to describe privacy concerns, is presented along with 
how to measure the percentage of information loss; the way how anonymization techniques are 
implemented is also referred in the same section. Before concluding the paper in Section 5,  
a Case Study is discussed in Section 4. In that section, Sakila database is presented highlighting 
the privacy problems arising in that context; then the desired transformation for privacy 
preservation is shown written in PrivasL and the tables transformed according to that description 
are also shown; a discussion about the results obtained closes Section 4. 
2. DATA ANONYMIZATION - TECHNIQUES AND METHODS 
As it was discussed, the Data Publisher is in charge of select and transform the data to be 
provided. Typically, this process brings a loss of information’s usefulness. The process of 
balancing the privacy with the loss of information is commonly referred as privacy-preserving 
data publishing (PPDP). It will always be necessary, and it will always be the biggest challenge, 
that Data Publisher factors these two weights during the PPDP process to ensure that the 
collected data is useful so it can be later explored. This challenge raises three questions (Wong 
and Fu, 2010). 
2.1 How Does the Data Publisher Prepares the Data to be Modified? 
In order to be able to answer this question, it is necessary to understand some fundamental 
concepts used in the PPDP. The existing information and its parts can be classified into different 
attribute types (Wong and Fu, 2010; Sharma Amita et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2014): 
 Identifier (ID): It is an attribute or set of attributes, such as name, telephone number, 
social security number, which contains information that allows to directly and uniquely 
identify an individual; 
 Quasi-identifier (QID): a set of attributes that can potentially lead to the identification 
of record owners (e.g. in (Sweeney, 2000), the report stated that in a U.S. Census the 
set of 5-digit Zip, gender and birth date, allowed the identification of 87% of the 
population); 
 Sensitive Attribute (SA): consist of information specific to each individual they wish 
to enclose, such as illness, salary value, level of disability, etc.; 
 Non-Sensitive Attributes (NSA): all attributes that do not fit in the three previous 
categories are non-sensitive attributes. 
Based on this categorization a set of data anonymization techniques can be applied. 
(Fung et al., 2010): Generalization, Bucketization, Suppression, Anatomization, Permutation, 
and Perturbation.  Each of these techniques ends up being used inside the algorithms developed 
to implement the anonymization. 
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2.2 How Does the Data Owner Guarantee that the Modified Data 
are Protected from Attacks? 
The assurance that the modified data is protected can be given by quantifying the preservation 
of privacy according to the type of privacy threats (Fung et al., 2010). 
Table 1. Main Privacy models with associated attack models. Adapted from (Fung et al., 2010;  
Mendes and Vilela, 2017) 
















and Sweeney, 1998) 
Anonymity is guaranteed by the 
existence of at least other k-1 
undistinguishable (w.r.t. the QID) 
records for each record in a 
database. This group of k 
undistinguishable records is 
referred to as equivalence class. 
Wireless Sensor 
Networks (Groat, Hey 
and Forrest, 2011), 
Location-based services 
(Bamba et al., 2008), 
Cloud (He et al., 2016), 
E-health (Gal, Chen and 
Gangopadhyay, 2008)  
✓ 
 




Expands the k-anonymity model 
by requiring every equivalence 
class to have at least one “well-
represented” value for the sensitive 
attributes. 
E-health (Gal, Chen and 
Gangopadhyay, 2008; 
Kim, Sung and Chung, 
2014), Location-based 
services (Bamba et al., 
2008; Liu, Hua and Cai, 
2009)  





Extends the l-diversity model by 
treating the values of a sensitive-
attribute distinctly by taking into 
account the sensitive-attribute's 
distribution of data values. 
Location-based 
services (Riboni et al., 
2009)  ✓  ✓ 
Personalized 
Privacy (Xiao and 
Tao, 2006) 
Achieved by creating a taxonomy 
tree using generalization, and by 
allowing the record owners to 
define a guarding node. Owners’ 
privacy is breached if an attacker 
is allowed to infer any sensitive 
value from the subtree of the 
guarding node with a probability 
(breach probability) greater that a 
certain threshold. 
Social Networks (Yuan, 
Chen and Yu, 2010), 
Location-based services 
(Agir et al., 2014; 
Ghasemi Komishani, 
Abadi and Deldar, 
2016)] 
 ✓   
 ε-Differential Privacy 
(Dwork, 2006) 
Ensures that a single record does 
not considerably affect (adjustable 
through the value ε) the outcome 
of the analysis of the dataset. In 
this sense, a person’s privacy will 
not be affected by participating in 
the data collection since it will not 
make significant difference in the 
final outcome. 
E-health (Dankar and El 
Emam, 2013; Lin et al., 
2016), Smart meters 
(Zhang et al., 2017), 
Location-based 
services (Elsalamouny 
and Gambs, 2016)  
  ✓ ✓ 
 
According to (Fung et al., 2010), threats to privacy can be classified into two categories: 
 The first category considers that the adversary or attacker is capable of identifying the 
record of a target individual by linking the record to data from other sources, such as 
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linking the record to a record in a published data table (this is called record linkage 
method), to a sensitive attribute in a published data table (this is called attribute linkage 
method), or to the published data table itself (this is called table linkage method);  
 The second category aims at achieving the uninformative principle (Machanavajjhala 
et al., 2006): consider that the attacker or adversary has enough background knowledge 
to execute a probabilistic attack, that is, the adversary is able to make a confident 
inference about whether the target’s record exist in the table or which value the target’s 
sensitive attribute would take and because of that, the publish data, cannot disclose 
additional information beyond the background knowledge that may already have.  
According to the attack models and to measure the quantification of privacy preservation, 
different privacy models were proposed. In the Table 1 it is possible to consult the main models 
of privacy according to the different types of attack, as well as a small description. New privacy 
models have appeared recently but contain small differences from the models presented. 
Each privacy model in its definition uses techniques from different categories presented 
previously. Multiple algorithms were developed over the years to achieve such techniques. 
Figure 2 gives a general overview of how privacy models are linked to the privacy attacks, 
privacy attributes, privacy techniques and algorithms. The Figure helps to understand how the 
concepts around the privacy context are connected. 
 
Figure 2. Privacy domain context. Different concepts of the privacy domain with its connections 
2.3 How Much Does the Data Needs to be Modified so that no 
Sensitive Information Remains? 
In order to transform the data and generate new data without sensitive information, the Data 
Publisher can use several techniques. One needs to remember that when the data is changed, 
exists an impact in its usefulness. There is always a trade-off between privacy and usefulness. 
The transformation of data to ensure privacy can be done in multiple ways and with several 
techniques and it will result in information with different utility. 
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Since there are available several ways to transform data, the Data Publisher should choose 
the one that seems to be the most useful. Generally the one that contains more valuable 
information for the data analysis (Wong and Fu, 2010), but that criteria can change depending 
on the purpose of the exploration phase. 
3. PRIVAS - AUTOMATIC ANONYMIZATION OF DATA 
REPOSITORIES 
There are lots of techniques to provide data privacy protection at the publisher stage. The main 
focus of the literature so far has been finding and/or creating new and better techniques to apply 
privacy to data. Due to already exist a large number of techniques and ways of protecting privacy 
and as they require some study on how they should be applied, the choice and use of these 
techniques is still an ad-hoc choice in accordance with business solutions and types of data. 
As a way to help and to promote privacy protection, this work aims to present a solution that 
helps to choose and use the various techniques and methods of privacy protection in data 
repositories in the data publishing phase (PPDP). This solution creates a tool - named Privas - 
that enables to: 
 Specify the type of data repository to be treated; 
 Identify the existing information in the repository and classify its type (ID, QID, 
sentive, none) – this step is currently manual; 
 Set desired privacy level (choosing the type of attacks to prevent); 
 Produce a metrics of the utility of data still present with the desired level of privacy; 
 Apply privacy protection techniques (PPDP) and methods to the specified repository. 
 
 
Figure 3. Global process of data exploration with Privas 
The goal is that, as shown in Figure 2, the Data Publisher user has a tool available that, after 
configuring the parameters, will automatically transform their data and prepare them for 
publication with the type privacy requested. To achieve this goal, the Privas tool and 
architecture was thought as a set of components/parts that serve different purposes. 
3.1 Tool Architecture 
Privas’ architecture can be seen in Figure 3. The different components present on Privas are: 
1. PrivasL, a domain-specific language (DSL) that allows the description of the repository 
type, the desired privacy level and the data types classification for that privacy level. 
This language must be expressive enough to allow all the needed specifications, and 
simple and intuitive to be easily learned by anyone;  
ASSURING DATA PRIVACY WITH PRIVAS – A TOOL FOR DATA PUBLISHERS 
47 
2. A core software unit, agnostic to the kind of repository, which will have the techniques 
and modes of privacy protection and the logic to add privacy to the data of the 
repository - by having this core unit, the goal is to allow an easier evolution of the tool 
to other repositories and techniques, and make it a task specific and simplified; 
3. A specific connector for each type of repository that will be responsible to transform 
the information into a format that the core software unit can then process and later 
generate the new transformed repository; 
4. A web interface that offers users a visual tool to obtain PrivasL descriptions. Within 
the web platform the user defines all the details about the repository and the desired 
transformation level and, in the end, a PrivasL description is generated. 
These parts/components are an integral part of a process (Figure 3) of defining the repository 
data and its types and enable the transformation of data in a way that guarantees privacy. 
By zooming into the core of Privas tool, one can see that Privas is developed through several 
independent and perfectly separable components, which are:  
 The PrivasL parser; 
 The connector to each repository type; 
 The set of PPDP techniques and models; 




Figure 4. Privas Core architecture 
The main idea behind this division is to allow the Privas tool to be modular and extensible, 
and therefore, easily scalable. Thus, new techniques can be easily added, and new repositories 
can be configured in few steps. 
In the next subsection, a DSL to classify and configure the desired privacy level is shown. 
3.2 PrivasL - A DSL to Classify Original Data 
The description written in PrivasL allows to configure all the transformation process:  
 Configure the repository type and its basic information (connection string, path, etc.); 
 Classify each data type of information present on the repository being handled (he can 
choose between ID, QID, SA, NSA); 
 Choose what type of attack models the repository should be protected from. These 
attack models can be Record Linkage, Attribute Linkage, Table Linkage and 
Probabilistic Attack; 
 Optionally define generalization trees to give domain context when anonymizing. 
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Actually, there are combinations of type of attacks that are not covered by any of the Privacy 
Models available. The PrivasL processor detects this as an invalid configuration sending an alert 
to the user. 
What the user has to provide through PrivasL is represented in Listing 1:  
 Database name; 
 Specify the tables where the privacy techniques will be applied, and for each of them 
classify the attributes in PPDP (‘@’: attribute identifier (ID); ‘&’: attribute  
quasi-identifier (QID); ‘~’: attribute sensitive (SA); and nothing: none of the others); 
 Type of attack (or set of attacks) that is intended to protect which offers some degree 
of privacy. For example, the user can choose to protect from the record linkage attack; 
 Optionally define generalization trees for the attributes to obtain a domain 
anonymization. 
 






        : 'Relational' 
relationalRepositoryOptions 
        | 'CSV' csvRepositoryOptions 
        ; 
 
relationalRepositoryOptions 
        : 'Connection String:' 
STRING_LITERAL; 
 
csvRepositoryOptions : 'Path:' 
STRING_LITERAL; 
 
dataDescription : NAME entities; 
 
entities : entity ( entity* ); 
 
entity : NAME '[' attributeList ']'; 
 
attributeList : attribute ( ',' 
attribute )*; 
 
attribute : attributeValue 
attributeTree?; 
 
attributeTree : '::' NAME; 
 
attributeValue : '@' NAME   | '&' 
NAME 
                | '~' NAME   | NAME 
; 
 
privacyOptions : 'Prevent from:' '[' 
attackModelList ']'; 






attackModelParameters: '<' NAME '=' 
NUM (',' NAME '=' NUM)* '>'; 
 
attackModel : 'recordLinkage' | 
'attributeLinkage' 
            | 'tableLinkage'. | 
'probabilisticAttack' 






    : '+' NAME ('as' NAME)? 
generalizationTree+ 
    ; 
 
generalizationTree 
    : '+' NAME generalizationTree{2,} 
    | '>' STRING_LITERAL ':' 
setOfValues 
    | '>' STRING_LITERAL ':' range; 
 
setOfValues 
    : '{' STRING_LITERAL (',' 
STRING_LITERAL)* '}' ; 
 
range : (']' | '[') NUM? ',' NUM? (']' 
| '[') ; 
 
 
NAME : [a-zA-Z][-_a-zA-Z0-9]*; 
NUM  : [1-9][0-9]*; 
STRING_LITERAL:   '"' (~["\\\r\n])* 
'"'; 
Listing 1. PrivasL DSL BNF definition - extended AntLR 
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When anonymizing the repository, the algorithms can transform the value in different ways. 
When a generalization occurs, Privas has two types of generalizations already built-in: 
 For numbers and dates, as they are continuous values, Privas offers out-of-the-box 
generalization in ranges between values. The number ranges are built from the values. 
The date ranges start by generalizing the month and can go through the year part. 
 For every other value not specified, Privas treats them as strings. So, when generalizing 
two values Privas tries to join the values with `~' (e.g. 'value1~value2'). When more 
than two values are involved, Privas generalizes to a more generic form to avoid 
disclosing much information while helping the generalization process: `*' character. 
Besides these built-in generalizations, and to allow a better and more adapted to the domain 
context generalization, Privas also offers the user the possibility of defining generalization trees. 
This tree should be composed by different levels. Each level represents a possible generalization 
and holds its value. In the leaves it will be the raw values present in the repository. Figure 4 
depicts a generalization tree for a numerical value (votes for instance a price attribute. Listing 2 
contains the tree represented in PrivasL description. 
 
Figure 5. Example of a tree generalization for a 
price attribute Listing 2. Generalization of Price attribute 
written in PrivasL
By using the PrivasL, the user of the tool provides all the information (type of information 
present in the data repository and attack to prevent from) required and desired in a uniform way, 
making this configuration confined to a unique entry point. 
3.3 Implementing Anonymization Techniques 
The Anonymization techniques are contained in a component reserved for such (Figure 3). The 
user specifies through PrivasL descriptions the types of privacy attacks to protect the 
repositories from. And, an available and appropriate model and its techniques is chosen and 
applied, transforming the repository in a new repository with data anonymized. 
The tool implements four privacy models: the k-anonomity model, the l-diversity model, 
the t-closeness model, and the e-differential privacy model. With these models, and as seen 
in Table 1, in conjunction, Privas cover all of the attack models. 
The k-anonomity model is implemented through the generalization and suppression 
techniques. k-anonomity model guarantees that for each QID present, there are at least k entities 
with the same value, making them indistinguishable. As seen in Table 1, this privacy model 
protects the repository against Record Linkage attacks. The algorithm chosen to implement the 
k-anonomity model was Mondrian. Mondrian is a Top-down greedy data anonymization 
algorithm for relational dataset, proposed by Kristen LeFevre in (LeFevre, DeWitt and 
+ Price 
  > Low: [0, 0.5[  
  + Medium 
    > ‘Medium Low’: [0.5, 1[  
    > ‘Medium High’: [1, 2[  
  > High: [2,[  
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Ramakrishnan, 2006). The algorithm is based on the concept of data partitioning that is a clear 
connection with the sections that are so characteristic of Pietre Mondrian work arts. 
Figure 6 instantiates the Figure 2 for the k-anonymity and shows this privacy model and the 
surrounding concepts that are tied to it. 
 
Figure 6. k-anonymity privacy domain context 
The l-diversity model was conceived as an extension of the k-anonymity model and as 
such, it inherits all the properties of the latter model including the protection against Record 
Linkage. Besides these properties it also ensures that each anonymous group contains  
at least l different values of the sensitive attribute value – preventing against Attribute Linkage. 
Therefore, even if an adversary can identify the group of an individual it still would not be 
possible to find out the real value of that individual's sensitive attribute with certainty.  
To implement l-diversity the algorithm followed was adapt the Mondrian base algorithm 
and adapt it to achieve l-diversity. The required changes to achieve l-diversity with Mondrian 
were 1) modify the function that validates the partitions to include the diversity and 2) modify 
the split function to produce partitions that are diverse (if possible). 
Like l-diversity, t-closeness model extends the k-anonymity model but it offers different 
characteristics when applying the privacy preservation. The concept behind t-closeness is that 
the statistical distribution of the sensitive attributes’ values in each k-anonymous group is 
“close” to the overall distribution of that attribute in the entire repository. This property prevents 
against the identification of the individual in the privacy resulting dataset and it prevents against 
Attribute Linkage as it ensures the closeness between different entities and against Probabilistic 
Attack as it not discloses disperse information.Typically, the closeness between two elements 
can be measured using different mathematic formulas, here it was opted for the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distance. To implement t-closeness the chosen algorithm was also the Mondrian 
adapted to this model. The changes to the algorithm to achieve this were 1) modify the function 
that validates the partitions to include the diversity against global data and 2) use the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance to obtain the diversity validity.  
The e-differential privacy model works differently from the previous privacy models 
implemented. It limits the knowledge gain between repositories that differ in one individual. 
This property offers this model prevention against Table Linkage and Probabilistic Attack. The 
way this limit is done is by replacing the individual's values for some value (mean of values for 
example) that dilutes the presence of different individuals. For example, if the value being 
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anonymized is the salary, one could replace the salary values by the mean of all salaries. This 
imply that adding or removing a new salary would not impact the mean value. Because of its 
nature and how e-differential privacy works, its utilization is best suited to statistical databases. 
The e parameter is sometimes referred as the privacy-loss budget, meaning that greater the  
e value less privacy will exist, and more information will be on the repository.  
In (Domingo-Ferrer and Soria-Comas, 2015), the authors reached a conclusion that the privacy 
model t-closeness when 𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 
𝑒
2, yields e-privacy. And for these reasons, to implement this 
technique, the t-closeness was used with the tweak in the t parameter. 
The Privas tool encloses all these privacy models and automatically chooses and applies 
them when different type of attacks is chosen. To allow an advanced configuration about the 
models being applied, the tool also offers the possibility of specifying values of the parameters 
(k, l, t and e, depending on the privacy model being applied).  
3.4 Measuring the Information Loss Percentage 
Knowing the impact, the privacy transformation caused on the data is crucial to take better 
decisions on what type of attacks to prevent from, and if the information chosen to be sensitive 
can be more relaxed. This metric can also give the Data Publisher a strong indicator if it makes 
sense to publish its data. 
Privas also produces this output after transforming the data. For each entity transformed  
(a table in case of Relational Databases), a % of the information loss is displayed. This 
information loss percentage is calculated by knowing how much the privacy has affected the 
entity. 
Each entity has N attributes (columns in case of a table) and L lines. To calculate the 
information loss percentage is required to calculate and sum the information loss percentage for 
each attribute. For each attribute, the information loss percentage of its elements (specific line 
in an attribute), must be added. The information loss percentage of each element depends on if 




, between 0 and 1 of information. The following formula calculates the information 




∗ ∑   ∑   {
1, 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ,𝑗  𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
#𝑔
1 + #𝑔






3.5 Web Platform 
To reach multiple and different types of users to use Privas to transform their repositories, a 
Web Platform was designed and implemented. This web platform was built as a Single Page 
Application, using Interaction Design Patterns (to help having a more natural user experience).  
The platform contains all the configuration information present in the PrivasL and described 
in Section 3.3. It works by helping build the information about the repository incrementally and 
in the end generate a description in PrivasL language. Figure 7 depicts the Web Platform main 
page where all the description options can be seen. 
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Figure 7. Web platform (SPA) that generates PrivasL descriptions 
4. SAKILA CASE STUDY 
Relational databases are widely used and well-suited in knowledge extraction processes due to 
their strong structuring of data. Because of its widely adoption and usage in the real world we 
chose a relational database as a case study of the Privas tool. The database chosen was Sakila 
database - a MySQL relational database (https://dev.mysql.com/doc/sakila/en/). The Sakila 
sample database was initially developed by a former member of the MySQL documentation 
team and aims to provide a standard schema easily available to all. This database is a nicely 
normalized schema modelling a DVD rental store, featuring things like films, actors, film-actor 
relationships, and a central inventory table that connects films, stores, and rentals. 
Because of type of information it contains, it has several tables with interesting attributes to 
be analyzed at the privacy level (such as customer information, staff, payments, etc). 
To apply Privas tool to the Sakila database we simulate the use of Privas by a regular user:  
1. We analyzed all the tables individually to identify if the table needed some kind of 
privacy transformation - this was done by classifying each information with either ID, 
QID, SA or NSA; 
2. After visiting every table and classifying its information, we collected the tables’ 
names and its attributes with the information classification and described in PrivasL; 
3. We added the rest of information needed to PrivasL description (database connection 
and type of attacks we are preventing the repository from). 
The list of tables in the repository is: actor, address, category, city, country, customer, film, 
film_actor, film_category, film_text, inventory, language, payment, rental, staff, and store. 
From the analysis of all tables and from the information classification we concluded that 
tables like actor, category, city, country, film, film_actor, film_category, film_text, inventory, 
language, and store, do not have privacy transformation needs given that all the information 
present, besides database domain value like primary keys or foreign keys, is classified as Non-
Sensitive Attribute. 
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4.1 PrivasL Applied 
On Listing 2 one can see the PrivasL description for the Sakila database. We can conclude that 




    Connection String: “jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306” 
 
sakila 
    address [ &address, &district, &postal_code, @phone ] 
    customer [ &first_name, &last_name, @email ] 
    payment [ &payment_date ] 
    rental [ &rental_date, &return_date ] 
    staff [ &first_name, &last_name, @email, @username ]  
 
Prevent From: [ recordLinkage ] 
Listing 3. PrivasL description to apply Privas to Sakila database 
From the analysis we concluded that no attribute has sensitive information that should be 
taken care. As an example, for this type of attribute would be the staff table having salary 
information of each staff member. This information almost certainly would not be a  
Quasi-Identifier but would be the type of information that is sensitive and should be classified 
as such. 
4.2 Results Obtained 
After running the Privas Tool with the specified PrivasL description (Listing 2), we obtained a 
new privacy transformed database. With Record Linkage to prevent from, Privas applied the  
k-anonymity. Figure 4 represents three examples of Sakila tables and its transformation. 
On the upper part is the original data and, on the right-bottom part the table with privacy 
transformation. It is clear from the data transformed for each entity that all the information 
classified as Identifier or Quasi-Identifier has been processed. The algorithm applied guaranties 
that at least 2 lines (k = 2) have the same values of Quasi-Identifiers in each table, preventing 
the attacker of knowing what entity holds that information. 
The staff table, for example, even though first_name and last_name were chosen as  
Quasi-Identifiers, its generalization (due to the need of k =2) behaved as the columns were 
suppressed. 
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Figure 8. Three examples of Sakila tables before and after Privas process  
4.3 Discussion 
Some of the conclusions that are directly extracted is that the type of information present is not 
so rich and definitely its transformation had an impact on the information present in the table. 
The information lost percentage was calculated with the algorithm presented before (Section 
3.4). For each table of the Sakila’s database the values can be consulted in Table 2. 
Table 2. Information loss percentage for each table of Sakila relational database 








The quantity of information loss is not far from what was expected: the tables with more 
Identifiers and Quasi-Identifiers by total number of columns, have a higher Information Loss 
percentage value. One factor that also weights to the information loss is the natural distribution 
of the data. If data already contains little values that make the entities identification impossible 
the need to anonymize it would be lower and the information loss would have a low value.  
The table staff, that has the higher number of Identifiers identified (values that are 
suppressed) is also the table with the higher value. Table payment, on the other hand, has the 
lower value, which can also be explained because it only has one Quasi-Identifier identified. 
With this information loss values calculated, if there were different techniques to apply that 
guaranteed the user with the same prevention for the requested attack, the algorithm that selects 
and applies the techniques could select the best suited technique for this use case. This is 
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something that Privas was built to support from its foundations since it allows the existence 
multiple models to solve the same attack privacy threads. 
Even with the information loss percentage calculated, the data publisher should always look 
into the output produced. For example, in Figure 4, one can see that the information remaining 
in the table staff is not that useful, due to the privacy transformed table only contains suppressed 
attributes and references to other tables. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Due to the technological evolution that has been observed in the last decades, the data and the 
information of individuals have gained more and more value. Data is a high value asset for all 
types of organization and is exploited for various purposes. No matter the purpose, all these 
exploration processes share some steps and actors; they have a common flow. This work 
focusses in the data publishing phase, where the most relevant user is the Data Publisher. 
Though the information and knowledge discovered by the exploration and use of data can 
be very valuable in many applications, people are increasingly concerned about the other side 
of the coin: the privacy threats that these processes bring. With the methodology based on the 
role of the user, it is considered that the Data Publisher should assume the main responsibility 
of protecting confidential data. Therefore, it must follow techniques that anonymize the original 
data so that it is not possible to identify the owner of the data. These techniques are categorized 
under the privacy-preserving on data publishing techniques (PPDP). The current problem is that 
the Data Publisher’s role is performed by the Data Collector or Explorer, that already has other 
concerns. Ideally, Data Explorer should receive the data with no sensitive information in it, that 
was treated by the Data Publisher. 
Although there is already a lot of information and many techniques in the bibliography, the 
Data Publisher in order to implement them has to do it as an ad-hoc process: analyze tables, 
attributes, data types, choosing technique, algorithm, apply rule by rule and repeat. Till the 
moment, it was not found any automatic approach to do so. So, Privas can be considered a 
valuable contribution in this field. 
Privas, using language processing techniques, allows to apply PPDP techniques to a 
repository. The tool produces a new repository with the privacy assured to some level. The 
architecture of this tool has been developed in a way to be divided into several components, 
which allows to easily add new techniques and new types of repositories in order to evolve the 
tool. One of the main components is PrivasL that allows to specify all the information that the 
user will have to provide: type of repository, entities to apply the privacy, the attributes and their 
types in PPDP format. The DSL is the only point of entry of inputs which makes the process 
simpler, because the user just has to write a textual description or fill the fields in a web interface. 
Privas tool, and the PrivasL, along with the web platform were successfully tested with 3 
case studies: 1) Sakila relational database presented in Section 4, 2) An U.S. census dataset, and 
3) an Employees relational DB (a large database with more than 4 million records with sensitive 
information). The required time for the transformation in each repository was not significant. 
Each technique has its advantages and limitations, so it is important that the tool behaves 
and offers several technical options to the user. No technique is ideal, and data privacy and 
utility are inversely proportional, so when gains occur in privacy it means utility has suffered 
some loss. Therefore, in the end, there is the need to provide the user with metrics that will allow 
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to analyze the trade-off between data utility and data privacy. As presented in this paper, Privas 
already automatically prevents against all types of attacks by having four privacy model 
implemented (k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and e-differential privacy). The next steps 
could be to increase the number of repositories that Privas supports, increase the number of 
models and algorithms implemented, and enhance the decision engine to offer a better 
performance when deciding which technique to apply. 
A completely automatic tool that is able to discover the sensitive attributes and to choose the 
most probably attack model that should be avoided would be a big challenge. Data mining 
applied to databases could be used to take this kind of decisions. Still, by focusing on the attack 
prevention and not on specific techniques, Privas eases and automates the anonymization 
process. The automatic choice of what technique to apply saves the user from having to have a 
deep knowledge in privacy domain while also sparing a lot of time when compared to the 
completely manual application of the privacy techniques. 
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